In a recent case of trademark infringement Delhi High Court passed an order restraining Rising India Entertainment production(hereinafter defendant) from organizing the event/beauty pageant under the trademark “MISS INDIA” and/or “MR. INDIA” or any other deceptively similar mark.
Bennett, Coleman and Company limited and ors. (Hereinafter plaintiff) have been organizing annual beauty pageant/contest in India under the brand/trademark ‘MISS INDIA’ since 1964. Plaintiff claimed that the trademark had attained great reputation and goodwill in India and Internationally. Also, Plaintiff registered their marks “MISS INDIA” and”MR. INDIA” in several classes including class 38 and 41.
On 30th June, 2019 plaintiff’s came across an advertisement of an event/ beauty pageant to be organized under the mark/ title MR.  & MISS INDIA WORLD, which contained the plaintiff’s well-known trademarks MISS INDIA and MR. INDIA. Defendants were promoting and advertising the said event/ beauty pageant on the facebook page inviting applications from the participants. In respect of the same the Defendants stated that they were not aware of the plaintiff’s trademark and in future will not use the same or any deceptively similar marks. Therefore, the order was passed in favour of plaintiff.

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However, it also exempted the rebel members of the ruling Janata Dal S-Congress combine from taking part in Thursday’s trust vote in the House.

New Delhi: The Supreme Court unfettered Karnataka assembly speaker KR Ramesh Kumar from any restraint on deciding the resignation or disqualification of MLAs.

However, it also exempted the rebel members of the ruling Janata Dal S-Congress combine from taking part in Thursday’s trust vote in the House.

In a short order read out in open court on Wednesday, Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi said an interim order was needed to balance competing interests and claims in this case in the light of the impending trust vote. The other constitutional issues — on whether resignation and disqualification should go hand in hand or be regarded as two separate procedures — can wait, he said.

“Const itutional principles should not receive an exhaustive enumeration by the court unless such an exercise is inevitable and unavoidable to resolve the issues that may have arisen in any judicial proceeding. In the present case, having regard to the stage at which the above issues are poised in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the same, we are of the view that the questions should receive an answer only at a later stage of the proceedings,” the court said.

The court said the Speaker was free to decide at his “discretion” on resignations. There is no court-mandated deadline to act on the resignations.

Speaker Ramesh Kumar had objected to the SC interim order which ordered status quo after the dissidents accused the Speaker of acting “partisan” and “mala fide” and mixing up the issue of resignation and disqualification to prevent them from resigning. The rebel MLAs had urged the court to exempt them from the trust vote as they ran the risk of being disqualified from the House should they defy the party whips to vote in a particular manner.

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The Supreme Court reaffirmed that wilful conduct that drives a wife to commit suicide or demand for dowry, both could attract conviction under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Supreme Court observed,

“Conviction under Section 498A IPC is for subjecting a woman to cruelty. Cruelty is explained as any wilful conduct which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. Harassment of a woman by unlawful demand of dowry also partakes the character of ‘Cruelty’.”

The observations form part of a judgment which was rendered in an appeal filed by one Wasim against a decision of the Delhi High Court which had confirmed his conviction under Section 498A of the IPC.

After his wife committed suicide by hanging, the Appellant was convicted by the trial court for offences under Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC for abetment to suicide and cruelty respectively. It was alleged by the prosecution that the deceased was being harassed for dowry and also that the appellant was involved in an extra-marital relationship and intended to leave his wife. A suicide note left behind by the deceased was also examined during the trial to prove cruelty.

During the course of the trial, the allegation of demand for dowry was not proved. But the conviction under Section 498A by the trial court was on grounds of subjecting wife to mental cruelty as the Court was convinced by the prosecution’s case that the appellant was in an extra-marital relationship.

This decision when challenged before the High Court which partly allowed the appeal. It set aside the conviction under Section 306 of the IPC noting that no convincing evidence was found to hold that the Appellant abetted the commission of suicide.

On the question of conviction under Section 498A, however, the High Court upheld the conviction but on a different ground. It ruled that there existed sufficient evidence for the demand of dowry, as opposed to the ground on which trial court had convicted – subjecting wife to mental cruelty.

This led to the Appellant approaching the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court.

The Bench of Justices L Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta noted that the High Court had upheld the conviction under Section 498A on the ground of demand of dowry without delving into the evidence taken on record by the trial court on that allegation.

The trial court had convicted the appellant on grounds of mental cruelty while categorically stating that no evidence to support the allegations of demand of dowry was found.

The Supreme Court judgment observes,

“It is clear from a plain reading of Section 498A that conviction for an offence under Section 498A IPC can be for wilful conduct which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide OR for dowry demand. Having held that there is no evidence of dowry demand, the Trial Court convicted the Appellant under Section 498A IPC for his wilful conduct which drove the deceased to commit suicide.”

The High Court had also observed that there was no element of physical or mental cruelty that could be proved in this case. It had, therefore, based its conviction on the prosecution’s case of demand for dowry immediately after marriage. The High Court had also noted that there was no demand for dowry soon before the deceased committed suicide.

The Supreme Court, therefore, ruled that the High Court could not have convicted the appellant on the ground of demand for dowry without a detailed discussion on the evidence relating to that aspect particularly since the trial court had found no evidence to show that there was any demand for dowry.

“The High Court ought not to have convicted the Appellant under Section 498A for demand of dowry without a detailed discussion of the evidence on record, especially when the Trial Court found that there is no material on record to show that there was any demand of dowry.”

Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and allowed the appeal.

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A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court recently clarified that when cases are settled by Lok Adalats, the parties are entitled to a full refund of the court fee paid by them.

Citing Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act, 1870, the Bench of Justices AS Oka and MS Sankelcha held,

“… when a civil suit is referred to a Lok Adalat which ends with an Award of the Lok Adalat, the plaintiff is entitled to 100% refund of Court fees paid in the said suit. Thus, a defendant who files a counter claim in the suit is entitled to 100% refund of the Court fees paid on a counter claim which is settled before a Lok Adalat.”

In the case before the Court, the parties had placed cases initially filed in court before Lok Adalats. After their cases were subsequently settled by the Lok Adalat, they claimed a full refund of the court fee paid in the case.

In one illustrative case, the petitioner was initially given a 100% refund of the Rs 3 lakh court fee he paid for his money suit. The trial judge had passed an order allowing the full refund, relying on Section 89 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act.

However, a district judge thereafter directed that the petitioner deposit Rs 2.25 lakh with the Court. This order was passed on the ground that petitioner was only entitled to refund of 25% of the court fee paid under the Maharastra Court Fees Act, 1959.

This move was subsequently challenged before the Bombay High Court, which framed the legal question as follows:

“Whether a litigant who settles a suit before Lok Adalat held under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short “the said Act of 1987) is entitled to 100% refund of Court Fees paid?”

The state contended that such litigants are only entitled a refund to the extent of 25%, in view of a May 2013 notification issued under Section 43 the Maharashtra Court Fees Act. The Government Pleader argued that as far as payment and refund of court fees in the Civil Courts in Maharashtra is concerned, the Maharashtra Court Fees Act is a complete code by itself.

The High Court, however, disagreed, finding merit in the petitioners’ contention that Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act read with Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act was applicable. Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act lays down that where a case has been settled by a Lok Adalat, the court ­fee paid should be refunded “in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870.”

Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act, which deals with refund of court fees provides:

“Where the Court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the mode of settlement of dispute [including by means of a Lok Adalat] referred to in section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the plaintiff shall be entitled to a certificate from the Court authorising him to receive back from the collector, the full amount of the fee paid in respect of such plaint.”

In view of these provisions, the Court observed that it is the Central Court Fees Act and not the Maharashtra Court Fees Act that would apply when it comes to refund of court fee in cases settled by Lok Adalat. As noted in the judgment,

“On plain reading of Section 21, the provisions of the Central Court Fees Act relating to refund of Court fees [Section 16] stand incorporated in Section 21…

…The effect of such incorporation is that the provisions of Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act stand incorporated in sub­Section (1) of Section 21 and Section 16 has now become a part of sub­Section (1) of Section 21. As pointed out earlier, Section 16 is applicable when a suit referred by the Court to one of the three modes of settlement under Section 89 of the CPC, which includes Lok Adalat, is settled.”

It was also noted that the provision for full refund of court fees in cases settled by the Lok Adalat was introduced in line with the policy of encouraging litigants to opt for such alternate dispute resolution mechanisms.

“On a conjoint reading of objects and reasons as well as the preamble, it is apparent that the said Act of 1987 has been enacted for giving effect to the directive principles laid down in Article 39A of the Constitution of India. Perhaps, keeping in mind the objects of the said Act of 1987 that Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act was incorporated in Section 21. The object of incorporating Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act in Section 21 of the said Act of 1987 is to encourage the parties to settle the suits before the Lok Adalat.”

In view of these observations, the Court concluded,

“Thus, it is crystal clear that once there is a settlement of a suit before the Lok Adalat, by virtue of incorporation of the provisions of Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act into sub­ Section (1) of Section 21, the plaintiff in a suit settled before the Lok Adalat by an Award of a Lok Adalat, will be entitled to 100% refund of Court fees.”

Before parting with the case, the Bench also directed that the judgment be circulated among lower courts and judicial officers.

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The Supreme Court of India has held that remand orders cannot be challenged by way of Habeas Corpus Petitions. The Bench of Justices UU Lalit and AM Sapre relied on several case laws to reiterate that,

“The act of directing remand of an accused is …. held to be a judicial function and the challenge to the order of remand is not to be entertained in a habeas corpus petition.“

The judgment was passed in an appeal filed by the Serious Fraud Investigating Office (SFIO) against the release of two persons arrested in SFIO proceedings against the Adarsh Group of Companies and LLPs by the Delhi High Court.

The SFIO proceedings were initiated based on a Central Government order in June 2018. Inter alia, the order stated that the SFIO should submit its report within three months. This three month period expired in September 2018. However, the SFIO thereafter arrested three persons in the matter, after obtaining the Central Government’s approval, on December 10, 2018. All three persons were produced before a Judicial Magistrate in Gurugram the following day.

The Magistrate, in turn, allowed a plea for extension of remand until December 14. Thereafter, on the instructions of the Magistrate, the three accused were produced before a Special Court in Gurugram on December 14. The Special Court extended the remand of all three until December 18 first, and thereafter until December 21. On December 14, the Central Government also granted an extension for completion of the investigation to the SFIO until June 30, 2019.

Meanwhile, on December 17, two of the detained persons (respondents) filed a Habeas Corpus petition before the Delhi High Court, contending that their arrest was illegal, to begin with. It was their case that the SFIO’s mandate over the case expired in September 2019, when they were expected to file their investigation report. Therefore, it was contended that their arrest in December was illegal and deserved to quashed.

The High Court opined that there was prima facie merit in their contention and ordered their release in the Habeas Corpus Petition (HCP) filed by them. This order, passed on December 18, was challenged by the SFIO before the Supreme Court.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta argued for the SFIO, assisted by Advocates Amit Mahajan and Kanu Agrawal. Arguments for the respondents were led by Senior Counsel Kapil Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi and Sidhharth Luthra, assisted by Advocate Supriya Juneja.

The Supreme Court, in turn, faulted the High Court for having entertained the Habeas Corpus plea, when there were valid orders of remand subsisting at the time.

“In the present case, as on the date when the matter was considered by the High Court and the Order was passed by it, not only were there orders of remand passed by the Judicial Magistrate as well as the Special Court, Gurugram but there was also an order of extension passed by the Central Government on 14.12.2018…

… The orders of remand passed by the Judicial Magistrate and the Special Court, Gurugram had dealt with merits of the matter and whether continued detention of the accused was justified or not. After going into the relevant issues on merits, the accused were remanded to further police custody. These orders were not put in challenge before the High Court. It was, therefore, not open to the High Court to entertain challenge with regard to correctness of those orders.”

The Bench emphasised that these remand orders could only be challenged by invoking ordinary appellate or revisional jurisdiction. It was observed that invoking Habeas Corpus jurisdiction in such matters would be inappropriate. Pertinent observations made to this effect include,

“The legality, validity and correctness of the order or remand could have been challenged by the original Writ Habeas Corpus Petitioners by filing appropriate proceedings. However, they did not raise such challenge before the competent Appellate or Revisional Forum.

… It is true that the arrest was effected when the period had expired but by the time the High Court entertained the Habeas Corpus petition, there was as order of extension passed by the Central Government on 14.12.2018.

Additionally, there were judicial orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate as well as the Special Court, Gurugram, remanding the accused to custody. If we go purely by the law laid down by this Court with regard to exercise of jurisdiction in respect of Habeas Corpus petition, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the Habeas Corpus petition and passing the Order.”

Time Limit set for submission of Investigation Report by SFIO only directory

Incidentally, the Court also had occasion to clarify that there is no mandatory time limit within which the SFIO has to complete its investigation. The Delhi High Court had ordered the release of the two detainees on the ground that they had been arrested after the expiry of the three-month period initially set for the SFIO to submit its report. However, the SFIO argued that any time limits set were only directory and not mandatory. (Habeas Corpus)

The Supreme Court agreed with the SFIO’s stance on this aspect, particularly given that there were no adverse consequences which would follow if the investigation is not concluded within the time set for the submission of the report. As noted in the judgment, (Habeas Corpus)

“… It is well settled that while laying down a particular procedure if no negative or adverse consequences are contemplated for non-adherence to such procedure, the relevant provision is normally not taken to be mandatory and is considered to be purely directory. Furthermore, the provision has to be seen in the context in which it occurs in the Statute.

it cannot be said that the prescription of period within which a report is to be submitted by SFIO under sub-Section (3) of Section 212 [of the Companies Act, 2013] is for completion of period of investigation and on the expiry of that period the mandate in favour of SFIO must come to an end. If it was to come to an end, the legislation would have contemplated certain results including re-transfer of investigation back to the original Investigating Agencies which were directed to transfer the entire record under sub-Section (2) of Section 212.

In the absence of any clear stipulation, in our view, an interpretation that with the expiry of the period, the mandate in favour of SFIO must come to an end, will cause great violence to the scheme of legislation.“

The Court therefore concluded,

“It cannot therefore be said that in the instant case the mandate came to an end on 19.09.2018 and the arrest effected on 10.12.2018 under the orders passed by Director, SFIO was in any way illegal or unauthorised by law. In any case, extension was granted in the present case by the Central Government on 14.12.2018. But that is completely besides the point since the original arrest itself was not in any way illegal. In our considered view, the High Court completely erred in proceeding on that premise and in passing the order under appeal.“

The Delhi High Court judgment was thus set aside. The respondents were directed to surrender themselves before the Special Court at Gurugram on April 1. (Habeas Corpus)